Abstract
Zusammenfassung. Die Eingabe von Information in eine geteilte Datenbank stellt eine spezifische Form des Öffentlichen-Gut-Dilemmas dar. Vorgestellt wird ein computerbasiertes Szenario, das diese Merkmale abbildet und eine experimentelle Untersuchung des Datenbank-Dilemmas ermöglicht. Darin wird untersucht, inwiefern ein Feedback über die Anzahl der Datenbankabrufe und ein Bonussystem, das die Datenbankeingabe entsprechend der Anzahl der Datenbankabrufe belohnt, die Kooperation fördern kann. Es zeigt sich, dass sich ein Bonussystem nicht generell positiv auf die Datenbankeingabe auswirkt, wohl aber die wahrgenommene Instrumentalität der Datenbank erhöht und die Selektion der beizutragenden Information nach ihrer Qualität verstärkt.
Abstract. Entering information into a shared database is a specific kind of public-goods dilemma. A computer-based environment mapping these specific features is presented which enables an experimental investigation within a database dilemma. It is tested whether a feedback about the frequency of use of a person’s database contributions, as well as a reward system providing bonuses associated with the use of individual database contributions, promotes cooperation. The results show that such a use-related reward system has no overall effect on cooperation, but it increases the perceived instrumentality of the database and the selection of the information to be contributed according to its quality.
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