Frühkindliche Handlungswahrnehmung und Theory of Mind
Vom Verständnis zielgerichteter Handlungen zum Verständnis mentalistisch gesteuerter Handlungen
Abstract
Zusammenfassung. Die entwicklungspsychologische Forschung beschäftigt sich zunehmend mit der Bedeutung von frühkindlicher Handlungswahrnehmung und -kontrolle für die spätere Entwicklung sozial-kognitiver Fähigkeiten. Dabei ist insbesondere die Frage von Interesse, inwieweit das frühkindliche Verständnis auf Zielobjekte gerichteter Handlungen eine mögliche Vorläuferkompetenz einer Theory of Mind sein könnte. In dem vorliegenden Artikel differenzieren wir zwischen nicht-mentalistischem (auf struktureller Handlungsanalyse basierendem) und mentalistischem (auf mentale Konzepte zurückgreifendem) Handlungsverständnis und stellen die Hypothese auf, dass das nicht-mentalistische Verständnis menschlicher Handlungen im Säuglingsalter eine wichtige Vorläuferkompetenz der mentalistischen Interpretation dieser Handlungen durch die Zuschreibung mentaler Zustände wie Intentionen darstellt. Wir untermauern diese Hypothese mit einem Überblick über die jüngsten Befunde aus längsschnittlichen Untersuchungen, die mit der Annahme einer Kontinuität in der sozial-kognitiven Entwicklung im Bereich des Handlungsverständnisses konsistent sind.
Abstract. Research in developmental psychology is focusing increasingly on the impact of infants’ early action understanding and control on their later social-cognitive development. One currently debated question regards the extent to which infants early understanding of actions as goal-directed may constitute a precursor ability to a later developing Theory of Mind. In this article, we differentiate between a non-mentalistic (based on structural action analysis) and a mentalistic (based on mental concepts) understanding of human action. We hypothesize that infants’ early non-mentalistic understanding of human action constitutes an important precursor ability to a later mentalistic interpretation of action by attributing mental states such as intentions. We review recent longitudinal evidence in support of the proposed continuity in social-cognitive development as far as action understanding is concerned.
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