Preconditions of Voluntary Tax Compliance
Knowledge and Evaluation of Taxation, Norms, Fairness, and Motivation to Cooperate
Abstract
Taxpayers’ willingness to cooperate with the state and its institutions, in general, and their willingness to pay taxes, in particular, depend on a variety of variables. While economists stress the relevance of external variables such as tax rate, income, and probability of audits and severity of fines, psychological research shows that internal variables are of similar importance. We present a comprehensive review on the relevance of citizens’ knowledge of tax law, their attitudes toward the government and taxation, personal norms, perceived social norms and fairness, as well as motivational tendencies to comply, and discuss possibilities for strategic intervention to increase tax compliance.
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