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Vicarious Dissonance

Reasons and Functions of Attitude Change

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000420

Abstract

Abstract. This paper proposes to make an inventory of knowledge on the process of vicarious dissonance, describing the possibility of individuals experiencing cognitive dissonance vicariously when they observe a member of their group acting inconsistently with their own attitudes (Cooper & Hogg, 2007). After identifying different factors necessary for or conducive to the development of vicarious dissonance, and after reviewing the nature of vicarious dissonance, this article will explore the reasons why an individual may be compelled to change their attitude under conditions of vicarious dissonance. We will conclude our argument by presenting new findings on this phenomenon in line with several theories. According to the cognitive dissonance theory, the reduction is linked to a decrease in arousal which leads to a decrease in inconsistency. While the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987) allows us to think of cognitive dissonance as a vicarious process, the uncertainty theory (Hogg, 2000, 2007) proposes brand new interpretations for answering the question “what are the functions of vicarious dissonance reduction?”, at both individual- and group-level.

“It has frequently been implied, and sometimes even pointed out, that the individual strives toward consistency within himself. His opinions and attitudes, for example, tend to exist in clusters that are internally consistent. Certainly one may find exceptions.”

(Festinger, 1957, p. 1)

This drive to perceive coherence between our cognitions has generated 60 years of research into cognitive dissonance. More specifically, this area of research focuses on situations where individual actors are confronted with an inconsistency between two of their cognitions. Faced with this inconsistency, the rationalization of inconsistent behavior is one of the means (the most frequently studied) for actors to reduce this inconsistency, with varying degrees of success. However, the rationalization of such discrepancies is not always successful, and a persistent inconsistency gives rise to an uncomfortable and unpleasant state of tension. This state of arousal, called cognitive dissonance, leads the individual to apply cognitive effort oriented toward its reduction or elimination. In this way, the study of cognitive dissonance has revealed the enabling factors leading to its emergence, as well as the means for its reduction (see Fointiat et al., 2013 for a review).

Although only a small number of studies have been conducted on cognitive dissonance in social groups compared to the extent of work available on cognitive dissonance (see Cooper & Stone, 2000 for a review), some of them clearly indicate that dissonance can be influenced by an individual’s membership of a particular social group. Matz and Wood (2005) found that cognitive discomfort and dissonance reduction occurs when the individual anticipates that members of their social group have inconsistent attitudinal positions on a topic. At the same time, dissonance can be reduced when other group members generally behave inconsistently and, by contrast, intensified when other group members show some consistency between their attitudes and behaviors (McKimmie et al., 2009). Glasford et al. (2009) also showed that improving social identity is a way of reducing dissonance when facing ingroup incoherence. Furthermore, a new form of dissonance has been explored – vicarious dissonance – explicitly based on group membership. Norton et al. (2003) investigated the possibility that individuals may experience cognitive dissonance vicariously when they witness an inconsistent act committed by a member of their own group. Indeed, the observer would feel a state of uncomfortable arousal, which they would be motivated to reduce by changing their attitude in relation to the action carried out by the observed person.

This inconsistency, leading to the emergence of a personal or vicarious cognitive dissonance, incites the individual to initiate dissonance reduction. However, in the literature, no study has isolated the reasons why individuals change their attitudes under conditions of vicarious dissonance. As such, this article will explore the available findings concerning attitudinal changes under conditions of vicarious dissonance in order to establish the current state of research in this field. We will conclude our argument by presenting new findings on this phenomenon in line with the theories of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987), and uncertainty-identity (Hogg, 2000, 2007). The literature review has allowed us to identify 11 studies that directly refer to vicarious dissonance (see Table 1).

Table 1 Studies on vicarious dissonance

Cognitive Dissonance, Self and Social Identity

Festinger (1957) described the process of the arousal of cognitive dissonance as arising from a binary relationship between cognitions (e.g., cognition X implies cognition Y, cognition X is the opposite of cognition Y, or cognition X excludes cognition Y). Following Festinger’s (1957) book on cognitive dissonance, other theoretical models have provided details on the conditions of the appearance of dissonance and/or its effects. A number of authors have shown how commitment in the performance of problematic behaviors, obtained through the establishment of a context of freedom (induced compliance) or with lower remuneration (forced compliance) leads to the emergence of dissonance reduction (Beauvois et al., 1995; Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; Kiesler, 1971). Thus, personal responsibility for the undertaking of a given act – based on the choice and predictability of the undesirable consequences of the act – incites dissonance reduction (Wicklund & Brehm, 1976), through attitude change (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), behavior change (Festinger, 1957), social support (Festinger et al., 1956), or even by misattribution of the arousal state (Zanna & Cooper, 1974, 1976). The radical version of cognitive dissonance (Beauvois & Joule, 1999), on the other hand, considers that the dissonance ratio is established as a function of a generating cognition and other cognitions considered as consistent or inconsistent.

Nevertheless, even if the large majority of authors agree that dissonance is a state of awakening that motivates its reduction, some contemporary versions are moving away from this assumption in terms of how to account for its dynamics (see Vaidis, 2011). For New Look model theorists (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), inconsistency is neither necessary nor sufficient for the awakening of cognitive dissonance. For cognitive dissonance to be awakened, the person must adopt behavior that could potentially lead to undesirable and irrevocable consequences. In addition, the individual must feel responsible for the aversive, irreversible, and predictable consequences of their own behavior. But another theory has highlighted the significant role of the self in the emergence and reduction of cognitive dissonance, stating that the inconsistent nature between two cognitions would not be sufficient for the arousal of dissonance but would require a ternary relationship involving the self (i.e., X implies or does not imply Y, when Z): the self-consistency theory (Aronson, 1968) suggests that cognitive dissonance is not created by any discordant cognitions, but rather by cognitions involving the self. The self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983), as well as the self-standards model (Stone & Cooper, 2001) also focus on the determining role of the self in the emergence and reduction of cognitive dissonance. The first places the reduction of dissonance as directly supportive of self-protection and self-improvement. The second, on the other hand, proposes an integrative model of the self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) and the new look model (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), considering that the cognitive accessibility of different aspects of the self determines how and whether a particular behavior leads to cognitive dissonance. In fact, the development of these theories has only accentuated research that contextualizes situations of cognitive dissonance in a social group.

However, empirical studies on the self consider it as multiform and multi-determined, and more precisely as both personal and social (Leary & Tangney, 2003), simultaneously integrating the personal characteristics of the individual (i.e., the “individual self”), the assimilation of the self to other important persons through dyadic relationships (i.e., the “relational self”), as well as characteristics allowing differentiation opposing “them” and “us”, defined by the individual’s feeling of common group membership (i.e., the “collective self”; Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Therefore, a number of authors suggest that if the self, or part of an individual’s identity, can be shared with others, or be based on a shared experience, through interdependence or belonging to a common category, then there is a possibility that dissonance may also be shared (Cooper & Hogg, 2007). In other words, we can feel dissonance vicariously when we witness the performance of a counter-attitudinal behavior by a member of a group we identify with (see Figure 1). The social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), by predicting that our own experiences, but also those of the group to which we belong, allows us to evaluate ourselves, and to establish a link between the dissonant behavior of a member of a group and the attitudes of other members of the group.

Figure 1 A model of vicarious cognitive dissonance (inspired by Cooper & Hogg, 2007).

From this perspective, the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) provide theoretical perspectives. According to these theories, individuals represent groups in terms of prototypes, defined through fuzzy sets of attributes (i.e., beliefs, perceptions, feelings, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors), allowing them to divide their social world into distinctive categories (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). The prototypes, by describing, evaluating and prescribing the attributes of the group, embody at the same time the defining ingroup attributes, and accentuate the differences between ingroup and outgroup members (Turner et al., 1987). Thus, the categorization follows the principle of meta-contrast:

“within any given frame of reference (in any situation comprising some definite pool of psychologically significant stimuli), any collection of stimuli is more likely to be categorized as an entity (i.e., grouped as identical) to the degree that the differences between those stimuli on relevant dimensions of comparison (intra-class differences) are perceived as less than the differences between that collection and other stimuli (inter-class differences)” Turner et al. (1987, p. 47).

Specifically, the categorization process is accompanied by a depersonalization process: it transforms a subject’s social perception of others (i.e., categorization), and of themselves (i.e., self-categorization), moving from the perception of a single individual to the profile of a relevant prototype of the ingroup or the outgroup. The process of categorization and self-categorization reflects a process of assimilation into the relevant prototype of a group, whereby differences between the self and others are replaced by prototypical similarity or interchangeability within the group. The comparisons of stimuli defined as members of the next, more inclusive (higher level) self-category would form and render noticeable the self-categorizations, blurring the distinction between the self and other group members, and allowing intersubjectivity between members of the same group (Turner et al., 1987). Thus, when the individual is strongly identified, within any given frame of reference, when group membership is salient (i.e., in situations that include a defined set of psychologically significant stimuli), the process by which group members experience the emotions of other members is then facilitated by self-categorization (Mackie et al., 2016).

Factors Necessary or Conducive to the Development of Vicarious Dissonance

The first experiments on vicarious dissonance aimed to assess the consequences of a participant observing another student agreeing to take a position considered by the observer as counter-attitudinal (for a review, see Cooper & Hogg, 2007). Given the perspectives offered by the cognitive dissonance and social identity theories, the authors expected that the action of witnessing the performance of a counter-attitudinal task by a group member would cause vicarious emotional discomfort to the observer. In their first experiment, through the induced compliance paradigm, Norton et al. (2003) created a fictitious cover story allowing them to ask students at Princeton University to observe a fellow student agreeing to make a speech in favor of increasing tuition fees, a measure contrary to the group’s attitudes. As expected, results showed that the simple fact of observing a person agreeing to perform a counter-attitudinal act was enough to give rise to vicarious dissonance in the observer (see Figure 1). The authors then turned to factors that could influence the emergence of vicarious dissonance.

Cognitive Dissonance and Identity Factors

As already mentioned, and as we can see in Figure 1, vicarious dissonance is based on the idea that a strong identification of the individual with a group allows them to experience intersubjectivity with its members. The authors suggest that group prototypicality could be a possible moderator of the strength of this effect (Hogg & Cooper, 2006). More specifically, the greater the prototypicality of the self or others is, the greater the vicarious dissonance is. A study carried out by Monin et al. (2004) provides provisional support for this idea, showing a significant correlation between attitude change and the typicality of the group member. Hogg and Cooper (2006) therefore designed a study in which the prototypicality of the speaker as well as that of the participant was the main independent variable. By applying the linguistic subculture paradigm used in the study conducted by Norton et al. (2003), students were placed in a situation where they observed a fellow student agreeing to give a speech in favor of raising tuition fees, in low or high free-choice conditions. As expected, results showed that participants changed their attitudes when the speaker was in a condition of free choice, and even more so when the participant thought of themselves and the group members as prototypical members of the group (see Figure 1). The results also revealed an effect of group identification: when the participant considered themselves as prototypical, their identification with their prototypical partner seemed greater, and therefore induced greater vicarious dissonance. Thus, the perception of a high prototypicality of oneself and other members of the group seems to be the most effective determinant of strong intersubjectivity.

Nevertheless, the authors observed an exception to this finding. Strong vicarious dissonance was also felt when both the participant and the defender were weakly prototypical, when the former did not feel strong identification with the group, and when the latter agreed to make the counter-attitudinal speech. The social identity theory supports the authors’ interpretation: the participant, knowing that they are not typical, and discovering another member of the non-typical group, would create a particularly powerful social identity of a marginalized minority group (Abrams et al., 2005; Mugny & Pérez, 1991), and thus would be conducive to intersubjectivity. Thus, it is quite clear that the individuals who most strongly identify with their group are also the most likely to experience vicarious dissonance, making vicarious dissonance a group phenomenon, moderated by identity factors. One of its moderators could be the reduction of uncertainty. More specifically, in a vicarious dissonance context, the occurrence of counter-attitudinal behavior by an ingroup member could constitute a threat to the normative integrity of the group. Faced with the uncertainty created by the latter, we may think that reducing uncertainty about oneself could be a key motivation for social identification, because the latter enables, by its norms, the prescription of what is right to think or how to behave (Cooper et al., 2018; Cooper & Hogg, 2007; Hogg, 2000, 2007). Thus, the group could be a fundamental resource for reducing individual uncertainty.

Attending a Scene of Classic Personal Cognitive Dissonance

In order to ensure that the attitude change observed in the first studies was due to a dissonance effect, the authors set up a study to manipulate the variables traditionally involved in personal dissonance. Although a number of cognitive dissonance theory models question the harmful consequences of behavior as a necessary condition for the emergence of dissonance (Beauvois & Joule, 1999; Gawronski, 2012; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996), these authors agree that the performance of a counter-attitudinal act remains an important factor in the arousal of dissonance. The third study carried out by Norton et al. (2003) therefore manipulated the speaker’s choice in the performance of the counter-attitudinal task that they were responsible for (Cooper, 1971; Davis & Jones, 1960; Linder et al., 1967), as well as the potential undesirability of the consequences of the counter-attitudinal act (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Cooper & Worchel, 1970; Scher & Cooper, 1989; Stone & Cooper, 2001). Results showed main effects for choice, identification with the subject’s group and consequences of the counter-attitudinal act. In addition, there was a second order interaction: attitudes toward the discrepant position were more favorable insofar as the author had a high choice, when participants were strongly identified with the group, and when the discourse had a negative consequence. In this way, when the observer is strongly identified with the group, vicarious dissonance occurs only if it is personally experienced by the speaker.

The authors then tested the idea that the emergence of vicarious dissonance only occurred when the author of the counter-attitudinal speech was personally opposed to the measure they would have to defend. To do this, the procedure ensured that the participant (i.e., the observer) had understood that their comrade had acted in a counter-attitudinal manner. The observer’s attitude toward increasing tuition fees was therefore manipulated as we heard the author of the speech make statements such as “I think that (a tuition increase) is a pretty good idea,” or “I’d be against (a tuition increase).” Results took the expected turn: the simple fact of knowing that a member of their group supported a measure with which they did not agree led to a shift in the observer’s attitude, especially as they identified strongly with the group. However, regardless of the level of identification of the participant with the group, no effect was observed on the participant when the speaker was in favor of the measure they were advocating (Norton et al., 2003).

From Induced Hypocrisy to Vicarious Hypocrisy

Induced the hypocrisy paradigm is a paradigm of personal dissonance which, as should be recalled, reflects a situation where individuals advocate a pro-social course of action, and are then led to recall their past behaviors that run counter to that course. This procedure, developed by (Aronson et al., 1991), is based on two carefully constructed tasks: first, the person is asked to write a public advocacy speech supporting a pro-social course of action. This advocacy speech, being consistent with the participant’s attitudes, does not generate dissonance in the participant. In contrast, the second task leads the person to remember their past behaviors that run counter to this conduct. Thus, the inconsistency between pro-attitudinal advocacy and past failures in contradiction to it seems to provoke a form of dissonance, motivating the person to practice what they preach. If seeing a person perform a counter-attitudinal act is likely to cause us to feel vicarious discomfort, then we can assume that observing a situation of induced hypocrisy would lead to similar consequences.

In the health field, two studies have focused on the use of sunscreen in areas where students are aware of the need for protection against sun exposure due to a high risk of skin cancer. The experimental procedure involved a fellow student from the same university (Hogg et al., 2006), or a rival university (Fernandez et al., 2007) making a speech about the importance of using sunscreen in all situations of sun exposure. The student was then led to recall the moments when they had not put into practice what they recommended and would make excuses to justify the reasons why they did not. In the control condition (i.e., advocacy-only), the person did not recall past transgressions. The results show that,1 on the one hand, participants who attended the hypocrisy scene reported a greater intention to protect themselves against sun exposure compared to the condition where the participant was not made hypocritical (Hogg et al., 2006). On the other hand, the effect of vicarious hypocrisy was moderated by identification with the observer group: strongly identified subjects expressed greater behavioral intention (Hogg et al., 2006), and tried to acquire more of the sun block made available by the experimenters (Fernandez et al., 2007), provided that the person observed and made hypocritical was from the participant’s group.

If an induced hypocrisy scenario leads an observer to feel vicarious dissonance, then the moderating factors of vicarious dissonance should be the same as for personal dissonance. The literature on personal dissonance (Beauvois et al., 1995; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999) and vicarious dissonance – through induced compliance (Norton et al., 2003) – demonstrates the individual’s responsibility for performing the counter-attitudinal task. This was achieved for example by manipulating the freedom of choice the participant had in performing it, thus playing the role of a moderator of the dissonance process. Focella et al. (2016) manipulated the choice of the hypocrite in the performance of their past transgressions, and therefore their responsibility. To do this, a cover story was used similar to that used in the study carried out by Fernandez et al. (2007). As expected, results revealed a significant main effect for choice: the responsibility of the ingroup member in performing the hypocritical act influenced the performance of a normatively accepted behavior in the observer. In particular, highly identified observers changed their behavior in favor of pro-attitudinal behavior, through the acquisition of sun block, compared to those with a low identification with the group. These contributions therefore provide relatively direct support to the idea that the ingroup member’s hypocritical behavior constitutes a threat to the integrity of the group, and thus arouses vicarious dissonance in the observer. The authors thus suggest that the attitudinal support given to the hypocritical group member would reflect an understanding, by the ingroup member observing the scene, of the discomfort caused by dissonance, rather than leading to a rejection as might be predicted by the Black Sheep Effect (Marques et al., 1988). This effect, known as the Black Sheep Effect results in the manifestation of extreme disapproval of group members having violated the group’s important norms (Hutchison et al., 2008; Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques et al., 1988). More specifically, it describes the manifestation of more positive evaluations toward a desirable ingroup compared to an outgroup member, and more extreme disapproval of ingroup members having violated the group’s important norms compared to an undesirable outgroup member. Thus, hypocritical behavior by a member could lead to support from an ingroup observer.

Other more recent research shows the importance of the order of the induced hypocrisy procedure: the ingroup member’s transgressive behavior is perceived as more hypocritical when they advocate a plan of action and later admit to not respecting it, compared to when they learn of the transgression of the ingroup member before the advocacy speech (Barden et al., 2005, 2013). However, the same transgressive deviation is considered less hypocritical when carried out by a member of the outgroup, and the order in which it is presented to the observer does not moderate the effects.

The Nature of the Vicarious Dissonance Experience

Vicarious Dissonance: Adopting an Egocentric Point of View

After observing the possibility of an observer vicariously experiencing dissonance, and after exploring the factors allowing or facilitating its emergence, the authors became interested in its nature (Blackman et al., 2016; Focella et al., 2016). What motivates vicarious dissonance? And above all, is it a feeling similar to that which is felt in a situation of personal cognitive dissonance? As described above, vicarious dissonance is based on an identity process. As this process leads to intersubjectivity between members of the same group, the process by which group members experience the emotions of other members is then facilitated by self-classification (Mackie et al., 2016). But what is the nature of this latter process that allows a member to experience the emotions of other members of their group?

Authors working on empathy distinguish different situations, and in particular that in which observers automatically experience the emotion experienced by the other person versus circumstances in which the observer is motivated to understand, in a very active way, the emotional situation that the actor is experiencing. The first reflects the emotion of an actor that is simply reflected in the emotional state of their observer (i.e., “emotional contagion”) (Asch, 1952; Heider, 1958), that La Pierre and Farnsworth (1949) understand as “empathic emotion” and which refers to the action of

“mentally putting oneself in the place of another and reacting more or less intensely to the stimuli that actually impinge upon that other person. Thus, should a person with whom we have closely identified ourselves cut his finger in our presence, we would vicariously ‘feel the pain of that hurt’” (p. 225).

The second, defined as “sympathy,” reflects emotions experienced as a result of understanding the psychological condition in which the person we are observing finds themselves. In other words, what the authors understand by sympathy does not imply that the emotion is identical, but simply congruent with that experienced by the author (i.e., “understanding the psychological condition of the other person”) (Asch, 1952; Heider, 1958).

“A person chatting with a friend who has discovered true love does not catch the same experience as his friend but with his ability to take his friend’s perspective, understands his friend’s emotion and experiences a congruent emotion of joy” (Cooper & Hogg, 2007, p. 376).

Applied to vicarious dissonance, a distinction must therefore be made between what can be described as “vicarious discomfort” (i.e., sympathy-like) and “personal discomfort” (i.e., empathy-like) (Norton et al., 2003).

Nevertheless, research in this area seems to show that, even with individuals with whom we feel close, adopting the other’s point of view is not easy. Epley and colleagues show that the perspective of what others are feeling seems to be taken from an egocentric point of view (Epley et al., 2004; Savitsky et al., 2011). From this point of view, vicarious dissonance theorists have been led to consider the possibility that the process leading to attitude change in a group situation is fundamentally self-centered (Blackman et al., 2016; Keller, 2015):

“instead of viewing observers as changing their attitudes because of their fused identity with the group member who is in the throes of dissonance, the egocentric view is that vicarious dissonance feels uncomfortable because it is the way I think I would feel were I in the shoes of the actor.” (Blackman et al., 2016, p. 2).

In their study, the authors systematically studied the role of perspective in vicarious dissonance through the paradigm of induced compliance (Festinger, 1957) or the classic free choice paradigm of dissonance (Brehm, 1956).

Results were in line with the egocentric view: the authors showed that participants only processed information on the consequences of the act when these consequences were important from their point of view. In addition, a process of vicarious dissonance was observed when observers were invited to imagine their own perspective (i.e., “Imagine how you would be feeling if you were writing this essay. What would be going through your head?”), rather than when they were invited to take the other person’s point of view (i.e., “Imagine what your partner is feeling as they write the essay”), or when no instructions were given to take a specific perspective. In short, these studies lead us to think of simulation, and not true perspective, as the engine of vicarious dissonance (Epley et al., 2004; Savitsky et al., 2011). This research therefore leads us to consider vicarious dissonance not as the result of an empathetic or sympathetic process, but rather as the result of a fundamentally egocentric process (see Figure 1).

Vicarious Dissonance and an Uncomfortable State of Arousal

Personal cognitive dissonance is described by Festinger (1957) as a negative emotional state, with motivational properties, and leading the individual to the implementation of cognitive effort oriented toward its reduction. Therefore, while a change in behavior may result from a process of persuasion or dissonance experienced in a vicarious way, only the latter should be able to cause a negative emotional state. To test these hypotheses, one of the studies by Focella et al. (2016), using the vicarious hypocrisy paradigm, incorporated a misattribution index into the procedure (Zanna & Cooper, 1974). The predictions were that behavior change effects should be reduced when the participant, witnessing the hypocrisy of a member of their group, has an opportunity to attribute the discomfort to an external source. On the other hand, in a situation of non-hypocrisy (i.e., persuasion), where the ingroup member fully complies with the normative model, the observer should adopt the speaker’s advice without the presence of a false attribution having any effect (Fazio et al., 1977). As expected, results showed that participants who were able to attribute their discomfort to external sources, after witnessing a scene of induced hypocrisy, showed less change in behavior compared to participants who did not have a misattribution. Conversely, the presence of a misattribution had no effect on the level of behavior change of participants observing a non-hypocritical ingroup speaker. In other words, while vicarious hypocrisy and persuasion may lead to behavioral change, only the action resulting from exposure to a hypocritical ingroup member is motivated by a negative emotional state resulting from a process of dissonance.

Thus, this research suggests that the attribution of problematic behavior to internal factors can be a mediator of the cognitive dissonance effect, in accordance with research on personal responsibility in the performance of inconsistent behavior (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). More specifically, in a situation of vicarious dissonance, the inconsistency between two cognitions achieved by an ingroup member would generate a physiological arousal of vicarious cognitive dissonance (Cooper et al., 1978), which the individual will label. Consequently, the dissonance motivation (i.e. vicarious discomfort) necessary for the implementation of a reduction mode would only appear under two conditions. Firstly, the physiological arousal of cognitive dissonance must be labeled negatively (if positive labeling, there is, then, no dissonance). Secondly, this negative labeling must be attributed to internal causes. In fact, if the negative labeling is attributed to external causes (as in a situation of false attribution), then the individual will not experience vicarious cognitive dissonance (Zanna & Cooper, 1974). Nevertheless, more research needs to be done in order to better understand the extent to which people who are exposed to a hypocritical member of their group can express positive emotions toward that member.

Vicarious Dissonance and Culture

Personal and Vicarious Cognitive Dissonance and Culture

Most research has focused on the possible cultural specificity of cognitive dissonance. With reference to the classic distinction described in Hofstede’s work (1980) between individualistic and collectivist cultures, Miller (1984) was one of the first to assert that many of the processes studied in Europe and North America by social psychologists were not necessarily generalizable to other cultures. Thus, he distinguishes between cultures that are essentially oriented toward the agent, socialized with a western European influence (i.e., individualistic), and those that are more holistic (i.e., collectivist), such as in Asia. In the first category, behaviors are largely determined by individual roles, obligations, and duties, while the second category is characterized by significant interconnection within social and societal groups. While Miller (1984) shows distinctions between different cultures regarding the attribution, in different social contexts, of the causes of behaviors, other studies also show distinctions between different cultures regarding the importance given to the coherence and responsibility of individuals in assuming responsibility for their actions, or the degree to which societies configure the self as interdependent or independent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Marques & Paez, 1994). In these studies, Miller (1984) hypothesized that cognitive dissonance reduction could be a culturally determined phenomenon, and more particularly present in individualistic cultures in America, Western Europe, or Australia, rather than a universal phenomenon. A study conducted in Canada (Heine & Lehman, 1997), on culturally distinct participant samples, provides initial support for these hypotheses, by showing that the prediction of dissonance based on decades of research in independent Western cultures was replicated for Canadian citizens, but not for the Japanese sample. This study questioned the fact that cognitive dissonance is a purely Western phenomenon rather than a general one, because it is based on the individual’s responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. Nevertheless, more recent studies seem to reflect a phenomenon of dissonance in interdependent cultures linked to how important the interpersonal consequences of a decision may be (Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Kitayama et al., 2004). And so, this research suggests that, despite the fact that cognitive dissonance can be observed in interdependent cultures, it does not appear under the same conditions in all cultures. In fact, the role of the social group in the emergence of the effects of dissonance is crucial (Cooper & Stone, 2000; Festinger, 1957; Zanna & Sande, 1987).

Vicarious dissonance, unlike personal dissonance, is a social event. It appears in a group, and more particularly because of the relationships between the members of a group. It reflects a discomfort generated, among the members of the ingroup, by the performance of an act which is counter-attitudinal for the group membership and the interpersonal relationship between members of the same group. Therefore, dissonance should be a feature of interdependent cultures. To test this hypothesis, a study was conducted, through the induced compliance paradigm, on tuition fee increases, similar to that of Norton et al. (2003). In this one, participants, students from Korea University (Seoul), were recruited for a linguistic subculture task, and heard a student from their university, or from a competing university (i.e., Yonsei University) agree to make a speech in favor of raising tuition fees for students from South Korea. The students of Korea University, hearing the speech given by a student of the same university, thought they were attending a speech given by a member of the ingroup. On the other hand, students who thought the speaker was from Yonsei University thought they were listening to a member of the outgroup. Similarly to the experiment led by Norton et al. (2003), speakers were asked to produce a counter-attitudinal speech that would be used by the university dean’s office for political arguments in favor of increasing tuition fees.

Provided that students identified strongly with their university, results showed a greater attitude change toward increasing tuition fees for Korea University students, when the counter-attitudinal statement was made by a member of their ingroup. These results therefore support the existence of vicarious dissonance in interdependent cultures. These same authors also conducted a study on personal dissonance, through the paradigm of induced compliance (Chong & Cooper, 2007). In the latter, students at Korea University were asked, in a context of varying degrees of freedom, to write a speech in support of tuition fee increases throughout Korea University. In accordance with Hoshino-Browne et al. (2005)’s findings, no attitude change was observed. However, Korean students only showed the effects of cognitive dissonance when the highly interpersonal dissonance procedure was invoked.

Multiple Cultural Identities

As mentioned in the social identity theory, each person belongs to many different social groups and categories, whose cognitive and contextual accessibility may vary, as well as their identification strength and subjective importance. Certain situations determine the psychological salience of a social identity, which in turn determines the existence of an intersubjectivity, necessary for the process of vicarious dissonance.

“A university student who is a member of a university basketball team and also the university’s debate team will think of his or her basketball identity when in basketball attire and more about debate team membership when dressed in a suit.” (Cooper & Hogg, 2007, p. 388).

Similarly, a large number of individuals can be identified with different cultural groups. In a given situation, an Asian-American living in the USA may identify with his American heritage, and feel intersubjectivity with other American citizens, and may, in another situation, identify more closely as an Asian citizen. One hypothesis made by Cooper (2003) was that for people who share several cultural identities, making one of them stand out would reveal norms of judgment characteristic of the latter, and vice versa. Cooper (2003) manipulated the salience of the identity of Asian-American female students at Princeton University. As expected, the effect of vicarious dissonance was observed: participants observing a member of their group give the counter-attitudinal speech under conditions of free choice showed greater support than when the speech was ordered by the experimenter. However, under the condition of high choice, the attitude change was bolstered when involving female students whose Asian identity had been made accessible. The significance of the interaction between choice and identity showed that for people initiated with their Asian identity, the effect of vicarious dissonance was greater than for participants initiated with their Princeton identity. In conclusion, studies support the idea that cultural norms can affect the process of vicarious dissonance. Cognitive dissonance resulting from certain activities in one culture is likely to produce less consternation in others. Given the different standards of judgment used in different cultures, what may be considered an aversive behavioral consequence in culture A may be considered less aversive in culture B. Nevertheless, it would seem that the awakening of vicarious dissonance is particularly facilitated in cultures where the self is interdependent.

Vicarious Dissonance Process and Reduction Function

At Individual Level

The studies previously presented highlight the conditions favoring the appearance of vicarious dissonance (see Figure 1). Thus, personal dissonance is a negative emotional discomfort state (Festinger, 1957), which has been measured in various ways, both physiologically (Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990) and psychologically (Elliot & Devine, 1994). The literature argues that the attitude change observed in the various studies is intended to reduce the personal discomfort felt by the individual. In an induced compliance study, some authors found an effect in the order in which personal attitudes and reactions are requested. Specifically, they found indication of personal discomfort and an attitude change when the discomfort scale was presented before the attitude scale. However, no indication of discomfort was found when the discomfort scale was presented following the attitude scale. These results seem to be consistent with the idea that changing attitudes allows the individual to reduce psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Galinsky et al., 2000).

The order of assessment has also been varied in studies on vicarious dissonance (Norton et al., 2003). Regardless of the order of the questions, no signs of personal discomfort were observed. Nevertheless, measures of vicarious discomfort show an order effect: indication of vicarious discomfort and an attitude change were observed when the discomfort scale was presented before the attitude scale, while no indication of discomfort was observed when the discomfort scale was presented after the attitude scale. These results provide direct evidence that the change in vicarious attitude is based on processes of cognitive dissonance. As in personal dissonance, the change of attitude observed in vicarious dissonance appears to reduce the vicarious discomfort experienced by observers attending a scene where a member of their group performs a counter-attitudinal act. But this vicarious experience is only observed under the same set of conditions that would lead to personal dissonance: the member of the group placed in a free choice situation must be against the measure they support, and this measure must have high aversive consequences. Thus, when group membership is made accessible by the situation, intersubjectivity between group members, requiring high identification on the part of the individual, allows the individual to feel dissonance in a vicarious way, through an egocentric process.

At Group Level

One of the possibilities proposed by the authors is that vicarious dissonance reduction mobilized by the actors would have the function, in addition to reducing vicarious discomfort, of accomplishing interpersonal or intergroup goals. With reference to research on social identity and confirmity, vicarious attitude change could reflect a way for observers to express opinions in accordance with the group’s norm (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner & Oakes, 1989). Nevertheless, the studies by Monin et al. (2004) do not support this hypothesis: the authors asked participants to indicate, before and after the ingroup member wrote their essay, what the ingroup member’s attitude was regarding the measure they were defending. The results show that participants correctly recalled the speaker’s position with respect to the counter-attitudinal measure. The more the speaker was perceived as being against the position he was supporting, the more a change in attitude was observed in the observer. On the other hand, after the counter-attitudinal position was defended by the speaker, participants did not declare the speech author’s attitude to have changed. The vicarious dissonance effect does not appear to result from conformity to a speaker’s new position.

If conformity to a new group norm does not explain the appearance of vicarious dissonance, we can think that it could reflect a collective event that would have the objective of creating an “atmosphere of enhanced harmony and cohesion within the group” (Cooper & Hogg, 2007, p. 384). Indeed, the performance of a counter-attitudinal act by a member of an ingroup could create a form of uncertainty, that the individual would be motivated to reduce, by improving identification and solidarity with the group (Hogg, 2000; see Figure 1). As the literature shows, an act of personal hypocrisy is perceived by people as a threat to their self-integrity, going against self-beliefs about honesty and sincerity (Stone et al., 1997). Thus, after a hypocritical act, individuals, feeling dissonance, are motivated to restore their self-integrity by being honest and sincere about what they advocate to others, leading them to practice what they preach. However, we can think that when the group member is made hypocritical by admitting that they do not behave as prescribed by the standards, ingroup observers may perceive a threat to the image of their group as honest and sincere about important issues. Studies by Barden et al. (2013) provide initial support for these hypotheses, by showing that ingroup members may be particularly sensitive to the hypocritical behavior of another ingroup member. Specifically, these studies seem to show that the presentation of a hypocritical act in the conventional order (i.e., transgressive behavior first, statement second) reduces hypocritical judgments toward the hypocritical target, especially if the target belongs to the ingroup. Thus, if ingroup members are more likely to excuse the members of their group in order to allow leniency, “that could underlie a group matching effect on hypocrisy judgments” (Barden et al., 2013, p. 596).

While self-affirmation can be a means of protecting against the threat that personal dissonance induces (Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983), we may think that affirming a valued personal identity could also reduce the need for an observer to support a member of the hypocritical group. Faced with the threat of a counter-attitudinal act by a member of the ingroup to the norms of sincerity and honesty of the ingroup, self-affirmation could reduce the motivation of highly identified observers to reinforce their attitudes, because for them, the personal and social self share the same cognitive representation. In this way, self-affirmation would protect group members from the threat posed by the hypocritical act of the group member (Focella et al., 2016). In addition, more recent research has supported the idea that the adverse consequences resulting from a group threat can be mitigated by valuing collective identity or affirming the group (Glasford et al., 2009; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Sherman et al., 2007). Thus, if highly identified ingroup members bolster their attitudes in order to restore the integrity of the group, providing them with an opportunity to affirm their self or affirm their group before they are confronted with a member of their hypocritical group should significantly reduce the process of reinforcing attitudes.

These hypotheses were tested by Focella et al. (2016), as part of the paradigm of induced hypocrisy. In their study, participants performed a writing task to affirm their personal identity (i.e., personal identity affirmation condition) or their group identity (i.e., group identity affirmation condition) before witnessing the hypocrisy of an ingroup member. As expected, the affirmation of the group’s identity or personal identity prior to the exposure of a hypocritical scene reduced the threat perceived by the ingroup, and thus reduced the tendency of observers to bolster attitudes, compared to non-affirmation control conditions. Thus, these results support the idea that exposure to a hypocritical ingroup member constitutes a threat to the integrity of the valued ingroup. For highly identified observers, intersubjectivity can make the affirmation reduction mode effective in protecting them from the threat (Cooper & Hogg, 2007; Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Focella et al., 2016).

Moreover, Gaffney et al. (2012) show the impact of the presence of a third party observer in a hypocrisy context, specifically by manipulating their membership. The authors observe that the presence of an ingroup member on hypocritical behavior, regardless of their response, leads the observer participant to endorse group norms. However, when the witness is an outgroup member, the observer participant expresses strong endorsement of the group’s norms only when the outgroup member notices and remarks negatively on normatively hypocritical behavior. The lack of support for group norms when the outgroup witness does not notice the hypocrisy is consistent with the idea that a hypocritical act is threatening to the group’s standards, and that support for the observer’s standards is used to reinforce the integrity of the group threatened. Indeed, when the outgroup observer does not seem to notice the hypocrisy of a group member, the negative perception of the group does not exist, and therefore does not lead the ingroup to endorse group norms.

However, other results obtained by Focella et al. (2016) deserve particular attention. In their experiences manipulating the speaker’s choice in performing the hypocritical act, the highly identified ingroup participants indicated that the hypocrite had less choice not to use sunscreen. In other words, it would appear that highly identified ingroup members, faced with the hypocrisy of a member of their group, would not only be motivated to defend the group, but also the hypocritical target. These results can be compared to those of Monin et al. (2004) who examined the relationship of vicarious dissonance with a measure of empathy, through Davis’ multidimensional Interpersonal Reactivity Index (1983). Although no correlation was found between the empathic concerns subscale and the vicarious attitude change, the authors observed a correlation between the empathic concern score and measures of vicarious discomfort. There was also a relationship between the measurement of discomfort and vicarious attitude change. Moreover, as in the study by Norton et al. (2003), no vicarious discomfort was observed if it was measured after the vicarious attitude change. Thus, in a situation of vicarious dissonance, if the members of the ingroup are motivated to defend the group, but also the hypocritical target, we can think that the effect of vicarious dissonance could be mediated by more positive interpersonal emotions, such as empathy, compassion or concern for observers (Focella et al., 2016; Monin et al., 2004). Nevertheless, more research needs to be done to better understand the extent to which people who are exposed to a hypocritical member of their group can express positive emotions toward that member.

Imagined Vicarious Dissonance

Very recently, Cooper et al. (2018) designed a study as an extension of vicarious dissonance. The authors hypothesized that the mere mental representation of an ingroup member who acts inconsistently would be sufficient to generate vicarious dissonance. Specifically, simply imagining that an ingroup member would voluntarily engage in counter-attitudinal behavior would be necessary to generate vicarious dissonance. To test their hypotheses, the authors focused their imaginary vicarious dissonance procedure on attitudes toward the Affordable Care Act (ACA); attitudes that, in the USA, have proved particularly resistant to change in the current political climate. As the Kaiser Health Tracking Poll (2016) points out, there has been no change in public opinion about the ACA, despite numerous campaigns to convince citizens of its importance. The authors therefore conducted a study to test the hypothesis according to which an imaginary vicarious dissonance procedure would be able to influence the attitudes of citizens of different political persuasions (i.e., Democrats and Republicans) toward the ACA. More specifically, Democrat or Republican participants who imagine a member of their respective political group voluntarily making a counter-attitudinal speech toward the ACA will be more likely to adjust their own attitudes toward the ACA, compared to those who imagine that actors have no choice. Thus, the authors hypothesized that, under a condition of free choice, Democrats would show less favorable attitudes toward the ACA than those under the condition of low choice. Republicans, on the other hand, in a condition of free choice, would show more favorable attitudes toward the ACA than those in the condition of low choice. As expected, the results indicated a significant interaction between the choice and the political party. These results therefore support the idea that simply imagining that an ingroup member voluntarily engages in a counter-attitudinal behavior would be able to generate vicarious dissonance, which could lead to a change in attitude in favor of the counter-attitudinal measure. In this sense, in addition to demonstrating the effectiveness, in terms of a change of attitude, of the effect of vicarious dissonance, imaginary dissonance “has the breadth to serve a multiplier function in the quest for social change” (Cooper et al., 2018, p. 8).

Nevertheless, results obtained from this research are of interest for understanding the processes underlying the effect of vicarious dissonance. Indeed, when they observed a fellow member acting in a manner contrary to the group’s normative position in a free context, Democrats and Republicans reported feeling less identified with their party, and less representative of the group. “It is as though imagining another person choosing to act in a way that was counter to the group’s position suggested that the group was not quite what the participant thought it was.” (Cooper et al., 2018, p. 9). However, participants did not change their feelings of empathy and similarity with the group member, and experienced vicarious discomfort. Although at first glance these results may seem paradoxical, they may support the idea that the function of vicarious dissonance would maintain group cohesion (Cooper & Hogg, 2007; Focella et al., 2016). Even if the observer reduces their identification with the group, as a result of seeing a member of their group behaving in a manner contrary to the attitude, the observer may be motivated to support and align with the other’s attitudes in order to reduce their sense of uncertainty, but also to maximize the group’s identification potential in the future (Hogg, 2007).

Conclusion and Perspectives

The theory of cognitive dissonance has been an important field of research in social psychology for more than 50 years. In recent years, some authors have hypothesized the existence of a phenomenon of vicarious dissonance (Cooper & Hogg, 2007). As we can see in Figure 1, the process of vicarious dissonance is based on common group membership, subjectively important and attractive for the individual. When group membership is made salient, the categorization of group members and the self leads to depersonalization based on a prototype. This depersonalization therefore reflects a process of assimilation into the relevant prototype of a group, making it possible to reduce the distinction between the self and other members of the group, a process by which differences between the self and others are replaced by prototypical similarity or interchangeability within the group, facilitating intersubjectivity between the members of the group.

Thus, vicarious dissonance suggests the possibility that individuals (O) may experience cognitive dissonance vicariously when they observe a member of their group (P) acting contrary to their own attitudes. The necessary factors for O to feel vicarious dissonance after witnessing P’s counter-attitudinal act seem to be the same as those involved in personal dissonance. For Festinger (1957), consistency of cognition is a drive that motivates one to reduce any inconsistency when confronted with it. But research from the 1960s onward seems to show that incoherence alone is not enough to bring about dissonance and thus highlighted some moderators. We can say that cognitive incoherence leads to dissonance only under the condition of choice and if the act is public (Cooper, 1971; Davis & Jones, 1960; Linder et al., 1967; Norton et al., 2003), only when there are aversive consequences (Cooper & Worchel, 1970; Norton et al., 2003; Scher & Cooper, 1989), or even only under conditions of high commitment (Beauvois et al., 1995; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999) (see Cooper, 2019, for a review).

Faced with this vicarious dissonance, which seems to be an egocentric process (Blackman et al., 2016) leading to a negative emotional state, with motivational properties, O would be motivated to engage in vicarious dissonance reduction. Beyond individual strategies known in the context of personal dissonance, the vicarious dimension of dissonance seems to reflect group strategies to deal with the threat of a counter-attitudinal act by a group member. These strategies would aim to create a certain cohesion and harmony within the group, and thus restore the integrity of the group (Barden et al., 2013; Focella et al., 2016; Gaffney et al., 2012). Some recent studies suggest that, beyond the motivation to defend the group, the reduction of vicarious dissonance would have the function of defending the hypocritical target (Focella et al., 2016; Monin et al., 2004). If this is true, we may think that vicarious dissonance could be mediated by more positive interpersonal emotions, such as empathy, compassion or observer anxiety (Monin et al., 2004).

Not only does reducing vicarious dissonance decrease inconsistency, it is also suggested to decrease uncertainty. For Tajfel (1969, p. 92), self-enhancement is a core motive for social identity processes, through which we engage in a “search for coherence”. Thus, the presence of constant “flows of social change” in intergroup contexts leads individuals to understand the causes of these changes. “Through causal attribution processes they construct explanations that equip them to deal with a changed situation, and that preserve the integrity of the self-image” (Tajfel, 1969, p. 92). This motivated search for coherence nourishes the social function of stereotypes as elements of explanation and justification of intergroup perceptions and behaviors. A different analysis is provided by Hogg (2000, 2007), considering uncertainty reduction as a motivation for social identity. More specifically, disagreeing with a similar person, whom we consider to be an ingroup member for example, would create a form of uncertainty, that the individual is motivated to reduce. In such a situation, the social categorization identification (situationally or chronically salient) can reduce uncertainty, through “self-categorization in terms of a well-defined, consensual, and clearly prescriptive ingroup prototype” (Hogg, 2000, p. 233). Thus, the self-categorization process in terms of prototype would provide an “ingroup social comparative context,” cognitively or physically present, that “appears to validate one’s self-concept and associated cognitions and behaviors” (Hogg, 2000, p. 233). And so, the study of the a priori and a posteriori identity processes of a procedure of vicarious dissonance seems interesting, in terms of self-categorization, identification with the group and perceived similarity with the dissonant target (Cooper et al., 2018). Another area of research could be the types of groups experiencing vicarious dissonance. Thus far, vicarious dissonance studies have focused on collegial identity (e.g., Monin et al., 2004; Norton et al., 2003), national identity (Blackman et al., 2016), or even political identity (Cooper et al., 2018). It would be interesting to see whether identification with a minimal group (Bourhis et al., 1994; Diehl, 1990) would reveal vicarious dissonance.

A similar, but equally important direction to work on concerns the importance that the individual attaches to the values threatened by the performance of the counter-attitudinal act. In other words, we may think that the importance that the observer attaches to a value threatened by the performance of a counter-attitudinal act may influence the process of vicarious dissonance. Indeed, the literature shows that individuals are only motivated to reduce their uncertainty if it is important in a particular context (Hogg, 2007). Thus, we can hypothesize that if the observer gives little importance to the value threatened by the performance of the counter-attitudinal act, it will not generate vicarious dissonance. In contrast, the likelihood that group members will provide support to the deviant member may decrease in situations where the counter-attitudinal message reaches a fundamental value of the group (Focella et al., 2016). In the latter situation, the rejection or derogation of the group member is more likely to occur:

“for example, a person who advocates against drinking and driving (e.g., see Barden, 2013) and then causes a fatal drunk driving accident may be derogated and rejected by her group members rather than supported by them.” (Focella et al., 2016, p. 46).

This effect, the Black Sheep Effect, moderated by social identification (Branscombe et al., 1993; Hutchison et al., 2008), occurs when the behavior of the ingroup deviant is relevant to the group’s norms (Marques et al., 1988), or when this behavior challenges the status or eligibility of the ingroup (Pinto et al., 2010). As Festinger (1957) explores in his seminal work, the magnitude of dissonance experienced by individuals refers to the amount of dissonant cognitions relative to the amount of consonant cognitions. This dissonance ratio is capable of being modified by the reduction of dissonance mobilized by observers, for example by rejecting or supporting the hypocritical group member. If supporting the hypocritical group member increases dissonance, it is more likely that ingroup observers will reduce their vicarious discomfort by excluding the hypocritical group member, in order to reduce their discomfort. Conversely, in the face of a less serious hypocritical act, we may think that behavior change and reinforcing attitudes toward the hypocritical advocacy would be an easier way for the observer to resolve their vicarious discomfort.

Finally, in addition to research on the underlying mechanisms of vicarious dissonance, it would be interesting for subsequent studies to explore the utility of vicarious dissonance as an intervention, particularly in attitudes and behavior change in the areas of health (Stone, 2011), the environment (Focella & Stone, 2014), road safety (Fointiat, 2004; Fointiat et al., 2001), and intergroup relations (Son-Hing et al., 2002). Indeed, while cognitive dissonance procedures (induced compliance or induced hypocrisy) are effective, they nevertheless require costly efforts for the target individuals performing the tasks producing the dissonance. Such costs may not be viable, particularly in the context of prevention campaigns aimed at a wide audience at a lower cost. Therefore, vicarious dissonance and imaginary dissonance respond to the limitations of personal dissonance procedures, by providing a particularly effective means of influencing attitude and behavior change, which can reach larger, geographically dispersed audiences.

Appreciation is expressed to Pr Joel Cooper for his useful comments on earlier versions of this article. The authors would like to thank to Pr Grégory Lo Monaco for his proofreading and help in revision of this manuscript.

Sara Jaubert is a PhD student at the Aix-Marseille University (France), at the Laboratory of Social Psychology (LPS, UR 849). In her PhD thesis, her research focuses on vicarious dissonnace, intergroup relationships through theories of cognitive dissonance, social identity and uncertainty-identity.

Fabien Girandola is Professor in Social Psychology at the Aix-Marseille University. He is a member and assistant director of the Laboratory of Social Psychology (LPS UR 849) of this University. His fields of research concern social influence, dissonance, persuasive communication and decision making.

Lionel Souchet is Doctor in Social Psychology and Associate Professor in Information and Communication Sciences at Aix-Marseille University (France). Researcher at the Laboratory of Social Psychology (AMU, UR 849) and teacher at the Aix-Marseille University Institute of Technology, he works on the links between communications, commitments, and social representations.

1As the authors point out, these results were observed only for the women in the sample, the men seemed not to want to wear sunscreen.

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