An Introduction to the Moral Agency Scale
Individual Differences in Moral Agency and Their Relationship to Related Moral Constructs, Free Will, and Blame Attribution
Abstract
Abstract. The purpose of this research was to develop a psychometric measure of moral agency and explore its relationship with related moral constructs. Although our legal system, daily interactions with others, and most theories about moral psychology assume moral agency, few researchers have studied it, and there is no instrument devised to specifically measure it. Here, we present the Moral Agency Scale (MAS), a self-report instrument designed to assess the extent to which participants feel control over their moral choices. In Study 1, the MAS demonstrated strict factorial invariance; validity is further supported by its relations to similar constructs and reported volunteering behavior. In Study 2, MAS scores were associated with free will beliefs, moral disengagement, and judgments of moral blame. Results are discussed with reference to theory and future directions for research.
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