Abstract
Zusammenfassung. Der Rückschaufehler (engl. “hindsight bias“) beschreibt die Tendenz, sich bei Schätzaufgaben durch vorgegebene Informationen systematisch beeinflussen zu lassen. Dieses Phänomen ist gut untersucht, allerdings ist seine entwicklungspsychologische Genese noch völlig unklar. Deshalb haben wir 274 Kinder und Erwachsene gebeten, die Antworten auf schwierige numerische Wissensfragen zu schätzen. Zu jeder Frage wurde ein niedriger oder hoher Wert als “Schätzung einer anderen Person“ (einer “Lehrerin“ oder eines “Schülers“) vorgegeben. Die Versuchspersonen wurden instruiert, diese Information bei ihrer Schätzung nicht zu berücksichtigen. Die Ergebnisse zeigten einen deutlichen Rückschaufehler, d. h. auf niedrige Werte erfolgten niedrigere Schätzungen als auf hohe Werte. Dieser Effekt war bei den Kindern stärker ausgeprägt als bei den Erwachsenen. Die Quelle des vorgegebenen Wertes (“Lehrerin“ oder “Schüler“) wirkte sich dabei nicht aus. Die Ergebnisse werden im Rahmen des kognitiven Prozessmodells “SARA“ diskutiert.
Abstract. Hindsight bias describes the tendency to let one’s estimates be systematically influenced by previously presented information. This phenomenon is well investigated, but its developmental psychological genesis is still completely unknown. Therefore, we asked 274 children and adults to estimate the answers to difficult numerical knowledge questions. Each question was accompanied by either a high or a low value that was labelled as “the estimate of someone else” (either “a teacher” or “a school child”). The participants were instructed to ignore this estimate for their own estimation. The results showed a strong hindsight bias, that is, estimates were lower after presenting a low value than after presenting a high one. This effect was stronger for children than for adults. The source of the given value (“teacher” or “school child”) had no effect. The findings are discussed in terms of the cognitive process model SARA.
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