The Interplay of Experience-Based Affective and Probabilistic Cues in Decision Making
Arousal Increases when Experience and Additional Cues Conflict
Abstract
In a study using behavioral and physiological measures we induced experience-based affective cues (i.e., differential anticipatory arousal) toward a risky and a safe option by letting participants repeatedly select between two decks of cards with feedback. In later test decisions we presented choice tasks between these trained and new pairs of decks. In some of the trials a low-valid probabilistic cue was provided after stimulus onset but before the decision. Although we were successful in inducing experience-based affective cues these did not influence participants’ choices. In decisions without any further cues available people choose the safe and the risky option about equally often. If an additional low-valid probabilistic cue was available people followed this cue. Although experience had no effect on choices it influenced arousal. Anticipatory physiological arousal increased if the probabilistic cue and experience were conflicting. Our results are in line with recent findings indicating diminished loss aversion in experience-based decision making. They are also consistent with parallel constraint satisfaction models and shed light on the interrelation between experience, probabilistic cues, and arousal in decision making.
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