Electronic Supplementary Materials 2

**Parenting daughters does not increase monetary prosocial behavior:
evidence from the Dictator Game**

Hurdle model

The distribution of the dependent variable in Dictator Games is often bimodal: the endowment has two peaks, one peak at zero (i.e., give nothing), and another peak at .5 (i.e., split 50:50; see Engel, 2011). For this reason, we additionally carried out a hurdle model, that first analyzed the binary decision to be perfectly generous or not with a binomial logit model, and then used linear regression with a β-distribution for the degree of generosity conditional on the decision to give something at all. For the hurdle model, we reversed the scale when fitting the model (from generous to selfish), as the hurdle model predicts 0-values and not 1s in the logistic part. This allowed the hurdle model analysis to split the responses into two unimodal distributions. We report the results of the hurdle model in Electronic Supplementary Material 1 Tables S5-S7.

In the hurdle model, we observed an interaction between the number of daughters and the origin-of-the-recipient. We show all regression model results in Electronic Supplementary Material 1 Tables S5-S7 and graphical predictive plots to ease interpretation of the hurdle model in Electronic Supplementary Material 1 Fig. S3. We must caution the reader that the likelihood of keeping some of the endowment is almost 1.00 or on the logit scale OR = 20.64 [22.92, 18.36] and the OR of all predictors must be interpreted always in relation to this intercept.

Origin of recipient

The SOEP IS donation decision contained an experimental factor. It was varied within subjects, whether the donation was to be to a domestic family belonging to the poorest 10% of the population to a foreign family belonging to the poorest 10% of the population in Uganda or Kenya. Implicit in the variation is the manipulation of need, as 10% of the poorest families in foreign countries are relatively worse off compared to domestic families.

We did not observe any interaction effect of the experimental factor in the linear regression. Having one daughter decreased the likelihood to keep some of the endowment in males when deciding to give to a domestic family, OR = -2.43 [-0.77, -4.10], but it increases the likelihood to keep the full endowment when deciding to give to a foreign family, OR = -2.56 [1.26, 2.86]. A significant Daughters × Female × Foreign donation interaction, OR = -3.05 [-1.42, -4.68], indicates that for females the number of daughters decreases the likelihood to keep the full endowment when deciding to give to a foreign family.