Skip to main content
Search
Search
    Quick Search anywhere
    Quick search in Citations
Advanced Search
Skip main navigationClose Drawer MenuOpen Drawer Menu
Previous article
Next article

Vom Großen ins Kleine

Übertragbarkeit eines Modells der epistemischen Lebensspannenentwicklung auf den epistemischen Wandel in Kurzzeitinterventionen

Published Online:April 27, 2020https://doi.org/10.1026/0033-3042/a000485

Abstract

Zusammenfassung. Epistemische Überzeugungen (individuelle wissensbezogene Überzeugungen) haben sich als wichtiger Prädiktor des Lernerfolgs erwiesen. Es ist deswegen von immer größerem Interesse, Interventionen zu entwickeln und Faktoren zu identifizieren, die die Etablierung fortgeschrittener wissensbezogener Überzeugungen – sogenannten epistemischen Wandel – begünstigen. Allerdings ist unklar, ob klassische Stufenmodelle der Lebensspannenentwicklung epistemischer Überzeugungen sich überhaupt in ihrer bisherigen Form auf den epistemischen Wandel in Kurzzeitinterventionen übertragen lassen, oder, ob die hierbei zugrundeliegenden Prozesse grundsätzlich verschieden sind. Die vorliegende Arbeit adressiert diese Fragestellung mittels einer Analyse der Effekte epistemischer Vorüberzeugungen auf den epistemischen Wandel. Hierzu wurden Daten aus drei experimentellen Studien reanalysiert (Ngesamt = 221), welche sich der Frage widmeten, ob über die Präsentation auflösbarer Widersprüche (Resolvable Controversies) epistemischer Wandel hervorgerufen werden kann. Die Analysen zeigen, dass sich in diesen Daten für das in Entwicklungsmodellen postulierte Zusammenhangsmuster keine Evidenz findet. Vielmehr hatten absolute Vorüberzeugungen (Stufe 1) einen direkten Effekt auf den Wandel hin zu evaluativistischen Überzeugungen (Stufe 3), während multiplistische Überzeugungen (Stufe 2) diesen Wandel sogar behinderten. Evaluativistische Überzeugungen schienen jedoch ein Schutzfaktor zu sein, der einer Regression auf „naivere“ Überzeugungen entgegenwirkte. Diese Ergebnisse werden in die bestehende Forschungslandschaft eingeordnet und ihre theoretischen und praktischen Implikationen diskutiert. Eine englische Übersetzung als Rohfassung dieses Artikels finden Sie als Elektronisches Supplement 1.


Does Epistemic Change in Short-Term Interventions Adhere to Processes Outlined in Models of Long-Term Epistemic Development?

Abstract. Prior research has shown that epistemic beliefs (individual beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing) are closely connected to learning outcomes and multiple source use. As a consequence, an increasing number of studies aims to (1) develop intervention programs which foster advanced epistemic beliefs, and (2) identify factors that facilitate this so-called epistemic change process. However, even though the overarching aim of such research is to improve our general understanding of the epistemic change process, it is still unclear if—or to what extent—processes outlined in established stage models on long-term epistemic development also apply to intervention-related changes in epistemic beliefs. The present paper addresses this research question by investigating how prior epistemic beliefs affect changes in epistemic beliefs during a short-term intervention. For this purpose, we reanalyzed data of three experimental studies (Ntotal = 221) which examined if an intervention that presented resolvable controversies (apparently conflicting but by means of cues reconcilable knowledge claims) promoted change towards advanced epistemic beliefs. The pattern of changes found in our analyses substantially differed from the pattern of change proposed in developmental models. More specifically, prior absolute beliefs (level 1) unexpectedly fostered change towards evaluativism (level 3), while prior multiplistic beliefs (level 2) even impaired this change process. In line with our expectations, prior evaluativistic beliefs, however, prevented subjects from reverting to more ‘naïve’ epistemic positions. Practical and theoretical implications of these results are discussed.

Literatur

  • Barzilai, S. & Ka’adan, I. (2017). Learning to integrate divergent information sources. The interplay of epistemic cognition and epistemic metacognition. Metacognition and Learning, 12, 193 – 232. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11409-016-9165-7 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Barzilai, S., Tzadok, E. & Eshet-Alkalai, Y. (2015). Sourcing while reading divergent expert accounts. Pathways from views of knowing to written argumentation. Instructional Science, 43, 737 – 766. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11251-015-9359-4 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Barzilai, S. & Weinstock, M. P. (2015). Measuring epistemic thinking within and across topics. A scenario-based approach. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 42, 141 – 158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cedpsych.2015.06.006 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Bråten, I. (2016). Epistemic cognition interventions: Issues, challenges, and directions. In J. A. GreenW. A. SandovalI. Bråten (Eds.), Handbook of epistemic cognition (S. 360 – 371). London, UK: Routledge. First citation in articleGoogle Scholar

  • Charrad, M., Ghazzali, N., Boiteau, V. & Niknafs, A. (2014). NbClust. An R Package for Determining the Relevant Number of Clusters in a Data Set. Journal of Statistical Software, 61 (6) https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v061.i06 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Ferguson, L. E., Bråten, I. & Strømsø, H. I. (2012). Epistemic cognition when students read multiple documents containing conflicting scientific evidence. A think-aloud study. Learning and Instruction, 22 (2), 103 – 120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2011.08.002 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Greene, J. A., Cartiff, B. M. & Duke, R. F. (2018). A meta-analytic review of the relationship between epistemic cognition and academic achievement. Journal of Educational Psychology, 110 (8), 1084 – 1111. https://doi.org/10.1037/edu0000263 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Hofer, B. K. & Pintrich, P. R. (1997). The development of epistemological theories. Beliefs about knowledge and knowing and their relation to learning. Review of Educational Research, 67 (1), 88 – 140. https://doi.org/10.3102/00346543067001088 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Kienhues, D., Ferguson, L. E. & Stahl, E. (2016). Diverging information and epistemic change. In J. A. GreenW. A. SandovalI. Bråten (Eds.), Handbook of epistemic cognition (S. 318 – 330). London, UK: Routledge. First citation in articleGoogle Scholar

  • Kienhues, D., Stadtler, M. & Bromme, R. (2011). Dealing with conflicting or consistent medical information on the web. When expert information breeds laypersons’ doubts about experts. Learning and Instruction, 21, 193 – 204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2010.02.004 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Krettenauer, T. (2005). Die Erfassung des Entwicklungsniveaus epistemologischer Überzeugungen und das Problem der Übertragbarkeit von Interviewverfahren in standardisierte Fragebogenmethoden. Zeitschrift für Entwicklungspsychologie und Pädagogische Psychologie, 37, 69 – 79. https://doi.org/10.1026/0049-8637.37.2.69 First citation in articleLink, Google Scholar

  • Kuhn, D., Cheney, R. & Weinstock, M. P. (2000). The development of epistemological understanding. Cognitive Development, 15, 309 – 328. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0885-2014(00)00030-7 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Kuhn, D. & Weinstock, M. (2002). What is epistemological thinking and why does it matter? In B. K. HoferP. R. Pintrich (Hrsg.), Personal epistemology. The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (S. 121 – 144). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. First citation in articleGoogle Scholar

  • Laursen, B. P. & Hoff, E. (2006). Person-Centered and Variable-Centered Approaches to Longitudinal Data. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 52, 377 – 389. https://doi.org/10.1353/mpq.2006.0029 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • McArdle, J. J. (2009). Latent variable modeling of differences and changes with longitudinal data. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 577 – 605. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163612 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Merk, S., Rosman, T., Muis, K. R., Kelava, A. & Bohl, T. (2018). Topic specific epistemic beliefs. Extending the theory of integrated domains in personal epistemology. Learning and Instruction, 56, 84 – 97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2018.04.008 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Muis, K. R., Bendixen, L. D. & Haerle, F. C. (2006). Domain-generality and domain-specificity in personal epistemology research. Philosophical and empirical reflections in the development of a theoretical framework. Educational Psychology Review, 18 (1), 3 – 54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10648-006-9003-6 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar

  • Rosman, T., Mayer, A.-K., Merk, S. & Kerwer, M. (2019). On the benefits of ‘doing science’. Does integrative writing about scientific controversies foster epistemic beliefs? Contemporary Educational Psychology, 58, 85 – 101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cedpsych.2019.02.007 First citation in articleCrossref, Google Scholar