How Affective Polarization Deepens the Partisan Divide in US Cable News Use
Exploring the Mediating Role of Partisans’ Bias Blind Spots in Media Credibility Judgment
Abstract
Abstract: Currently, not only are partisans’ feelings toward Democrats and Republicans sharply divided along party lines, but so too are their choices regarding news media. Regarding this polarization, most studies have considered partisans’ selective use of news outlets as a crucial factor in widening affective polarization. However, insufficient attention has been directed to the potential role of affective polarization in selective exposure. Accordingly, this study seeks to fill this gap by verifying the effect of affective polarization on selective exposure and examining a potential mechanism using two-wave panel data. Our findings demonstrate that the degree of affective polarization is positively related to partisan bias in the credibility judgment of pro-party and counter-party cable news channels. In turn, favorable in-group bias in the credibility judgment of cable news channels has a significant effect on selective exposure to cable news outlets, mediating the effect of individual-level affective polarization on selective exposure. Lastly, we discuss the theoretical implications of our findings.
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