Abstract
Abstract: Several popular conspiracy theories hold the government as one of the main figures of power, accusing it of various bad deeds. However, in authoritarian regimes or weak democracies, the state itself creates and exploits conspiracies about external and internal enemies of the nation. This paper explores the relationship between specific prostate conspiracy theory beliefs and conspiracy mentality in the context of Russia (N = 819), a country, where the government currently leverages conspiracy theories for its own purposes. These findings suggest interesting ways forward for the study of conspiracy theories in nondemocratic states. A discussion about the influence of institutional trust on conspiracy theory beliefs is provided.
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