Abstract
Zusammenfassung. Geschützte Werte (GW) sind Werte, die von Individuen oder einer Gemeinschaft als absolut, unantastbar und nicht substituierbar angesehen werden. Da es bislang noch kein Messinstrument zur Erfassung von GW gibt, besteht das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit in der Entwicklung und ersten Validierung einer Geschützten Werte Skala (GWS). Die in Studie 1 durchgeführten Analysen zur Überprüfung der Skalen und der Modellgüte fallen zufrieden stellend aus. Im Sinne der diskriminativen Validität kann gezeigt werden, dass sich GW von wichtigen Einstellungen abgrenzen. Für die Validität spricht auch die Bestätigung mehrerer postulierter Gruppenunterschiede. Der in Studie 2 vorgenommene Vergleich zwischen zwei Extremgruppen (Befürworter und Gegner der Gentechnologie) ergibt zusätzliche Anhaltspunkte zur Validität und konzeptuellen Differenzierung zwischen GW und Einstellungswichtigkeit.
Abstract. Sacred values (or protected values) (in German: Geschützte Werte, GW) are values that a community treat as absolute, not tradable and exchangeable for other values. To date, no reliable and valid measure of sacred values has been developed. The research presented here was therefore designed to develop a measure of sacred values (German title: Geschützte Werte Skala, GWS) and to provide preliminary tests. Study 1 examined the reliability and validity of the GWS and revealed satisfactory results. In terms of discriminant validity, the results suggest that GW has to be distinguished from attitude importance. Examining various group differences also supported the validity of the scales. In Study 2, a comparison between two extreme groups (proponents and opponents of gene technology) was conducted. These results provided additional evidence for the validity and conceptual differentiation between GW and attitude importance.
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