On Different Operationalizations and Conceptualizations of the Tendency to Believe in Conspiracy Theories
A Comment on Nera (2024)
Abstract
Abstract: This commentary in response to Nera (2024, this issue) offers an overview of different operationalizations and conceptualizations of the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. It distinguishes Conspiracy Mentality (the disposition to believe in any kind of conspiracy theory) from the Belief in Conspiracy Theories (described as latent variable or monological network underlying the belief in many popular and scientifically unwarranted conspiracy theories, sometimes also called conspiracy ideation or generalized conspiracy belief) and the belief in a specific conspiracy theory (for example surrounding the Apollo moonlanding or COVID-19). It emphasizes the need for researchers to be clear about their operationalization and conceptualization of the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories, especially when making causal statements about its impact on the belief in specific conspiracy theories.
Nera (2024) reminds us of two common pitfalls in psychological research: engaging in circular reasoning (defined as explanations where cause and consequence are the same) and black box explanations (a concept is only defined by its outcome), which he sees as a threat for research on conspiracy belief. The problems Nera (2024) describes are (a) ambiguities regarding the concept of Conspiracy Mentality, (b) that the concepts Conspiracy Mentality and Belief in Conspiracy Theories are sometimes used interchangeably, and (c) the fact that Conspiracy Mentality is often treated as a cause for a specific conspiracy belief, which in turn is also argued to be a cause for Conspiracy Mentality. In this comment, I first want to discuss the question of circular reasoning. I then want to offer some clarification regarding different operationalizations and conceptualizations of conspiracy belief by distinguishing the belief in a specific conspiracy theory, Conspiracy Mentality and the Belief in Conspiracy Theories. Importantly, none of the different operationalizations and conceptualizations necessarily pose a threat to the assumption of causality.
Circular Reasoning
Nera (2024) describes two problems which he reads as circular reasoning: First, the observation that the concepts of Conspiracy Mentality and Belief in Conspiracy Theories are treated interchangeably, and second, the fact that Conspiracy Mentality is often treated as a cause for a specific conspiracy belief, which in turn is also argued to be a cause for Conspiracy Mentality. Whether the belief in a specific conspiracy theory indeed is a cause for conspiracy Mentality is yet an open question. Preliminary research so far indicates that Conspiracy Mentality is not affected by experimental manipulations that increase the belief in a specific conspiracy theory (Imhoff et al., 2022; Pummerer, Böhm, et al., 2022). Even in the case that a specific conspiracy belief does increase Conspiracy Mentality, it would not necessarily be circular reasoning, as the possibility that A causes B does not rule out that B also causes A. In fact, Nera (2024) himself proposes the bidirectionality of Conspiracy Mentality and the belief in a specific conspiracy theory, suggesting bidirectional causation. Thus, it seems that the actual problem does not hinge on bidirectional causation but an unclear conceptualization of the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories and insufficient distinction from the belief in a specific conspiracy theory. Nera (2024) is right that some researchers have used the terms “Conspiracy Mentality” and “Belief in Conspiracy Theories” (plural!) or “conspiracy belief” all to refer to a tendency to belief in conspiracy theories. This tendency, however, is different from the belief in a specific conspiracy theory, which involves the action of a specific group or individual accused of a specific type of secret arrangement. A specific belief can be versatile: It can range from a belief about Elvis Presley not being dead to believing that the government is trying to install a dictatorship or the belief that one’s own boss is involved in a scheme harming the employees. The specific belief in the conspiracy theory might be scientifically warranted or not. It might serve as entertainment (van Prooijen et al., 2022), increase anxiety (Liekefett et al., 2021) or anger (Jolley & Paterson, 2020), or have behavioral implications (Pummerer, 2022; Pummerer, Winter, & Sassenberg, 2022). In addition to other factors such as situational motives (Douglas et al., 2017), political goals (Miller et al., 2016), group identity (Sapountzis & Condor, 2013), or subjective norms (Winter et al., 2022), researchers have argued that believing in a specific theory is predicted by a general tendency to perceive conspiracy theories in one’s environment. This tendency is described with different names, which usually correspond to different operationalizations of the construct. The term Conspiracy Mentality usually refers to a specific measurement offering five (Bruder et al., 2013) or 12 (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014) different statements generally assuming secret malevolent arrangements of powerholders. The term Belief in Conspiracy Theories (sometimes also called conspiracy ideation, generalized conspiracy belief, etc.), in turn, is typically measured as average agreement to different popular conspiracy theories, that is, nonmainstream explanations for societal events based on secret malevolent arrangements of powerholders. Since the problems described by Nera (2024) seem to center around potential misunderstandings regarding these concepts, I want to provide a clarification on different operationalizations and conceptualizations of the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories below.
Conspiracy Mentality
Individuals differ in the way they view and interpret the world around them. This includes their tendency to assume secret and malevolent arrangements by powerholders, which is also known as Conspiracy Mentality. A higher Conspiracy Mentality is related to lower trust toward politicians and experts (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Imhoff et al., 2018) and has been argued to be “an enduring individual disposition” (Imhoff et al., 2022, p. 5), as it is relatively stable across time and not easily manipulated by experimental treatments (Imhoff et al., 2022; Pummerer, Böhm, et al., 2022). As Nera (2024) correctly notes, the individual circumstances leading to the development of this disposition are not yet sufficiently explored. Additionally, whereas it has been shown to be correlated with many conspiracy theories, experimental or longitudinal evidence that Conspiracy Mentality causes the belief in one specific theory so far is still missing. Importantly (and potentially different from a lay understanding), given that it describes a disposition to assume any type of secret malevolent arrangement, Conspiracy Mentality should capture the interpretation of events as secret arrangements independent from their content (Imhoff et al., 2022), or whether this suspicion is warranted or not (i.e., whether there really is a secret arrangement between actors or not; Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019).
Belief in Conspiracy Theories
Specifically, this aspect of Conspiracy Mentality also applying to reasonable doubt might leave some researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers unsatisfied. After all, the public might not be concerned about individuals expressing rational concern about their government but worry more about individuals whose actions are based on perceptions that are scientifically unwarranted and not shared by the broader population (Sutton & Douglas, 2020), such as the idea of governments and scientists being involved in a scheme to convince individuals that the world is round while it is indeed flat or that the US government faked the Apollo moon landing. While it might be possible to distinguish reasonable doubt from scientifically unwarranted theories on a theoretical level (see Alper & Yilmaz, 2023; Brotherton, 2013; Nera & Schöpfer, 2023, for attempts to do so), the question remains on how to operationalize these scientifically unwarranted theories. The fact that belief in such theories is often correlated (e.g., Swami et al., 2017; Wood et al., 2012) has led scientists to use scales consisting of several such scientifically unwarranted theories, as for example in the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (Swami et al., 2010). Given that the correlation between such scales and Conspiracy Mentality is typically high (Swami et al., 2017) and that both concepts seem to have similar longitudinal effects, it seems reasonable to assume that both types of scales are tapping into the same latent variable of a tendency to perceive secret arrangements of powerholders. However, other researchers cautioned that it is “not clear to what extent these scales measure anything other than belief in a set of real-world conspiracy theories (…) requiring constant updating to reflect changes in the popularity of particular conspiracy theories” (Swami et al., 2017, pp. 5–6, see Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2019, p. 3, for a similar argument). Thus, this type of operationalization is somewhat depending on the conspiracy theories that form the scale, and it is possible that different sets of conspiracy theories end up describing, to some degree, different latent variables. Additionally, other researchers have argued that it is not a latent variable at all but rather describe the Belief in Conspiracy Theories as a monological network (Williams et al., 2022; Wood et al., 2012), where different conspiracy beliefs reinforce each other. Whether or not the Belief in Conspiracy Theories is better described as a latent factor or a nomological network is still debated. Yet, in both conceptualizations, it is possible to assume a causal relationship either in the sense that the latent variable identified by the scale predicts the belief in a different (new) conspiracy theory or in the sense that the network of other beliefs increases the likelihood of believing in a different (new) conspiracy theory. A logical problem would only occur if the specific conspiracy theory that is to be predicted is part of the cluster measured as Belief in Conspiracy Theory.
Conclusion
Most of the potential problems described by Nera (2024) seem to rest on an unclear operationalization and conceptualization of the concept of a tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Indeed, there are two main approaches of operationalization (Conspiracy Mentality: general statements assuming secret malevolent arrangements of powerholders vs. Belief in Conspiracy Theories: measuring the belief in a set of popular conspiracy theories) and different conceptualizations (as latent variable vs. a network). The different operationalizations at times come with different connotations (e.g., Conspiracy Mentality capturing any type of secret arrangements of powerholders while the Belief in Conspiracy Theories focuses more on popular and scientifically unwarranted explanations). Such a different connotation is not necessarily a problem, and there might be different reasons and societal interests to choose one operationalization over another. Similarly, just as light can be conceptualized as rays or waves, it is possible that both conceptualizations of the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (as latent variable or network) can be true and are able to explain different phenomena in conspiracy belief. In general, however, these different operationalizations and conceptualizations do not seem to pose a threat to the assumption of causality, in case the operationalization and conceptualization of the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories are clear, and when the belief in a conspiracy theory is sufficiently specified (i.e., specific group or individual accused of a specific type of secret arrangement). Whether the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (no matter if operationalized as Conspiracy Mentality or Belief in Conspiracy Theories) indeed cause the belief in a(ny) new conspiracy theory, however, that of course is also an empirical question that so far has not been sufficiently answered.
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