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Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1026/0033-3042/a000366

Zusammenfassung. In diesem Aufsatz entwickeln wir einen hypothetischen Klassifizierungsansatz, in dessen Rahmen wir verschiedene Formen des Verständnisses eines Wissenschaftsbereichs herausarbeiten und deren Bedeutung für die Risikowahrnehmung darstellen. Empirisch kann zunehmendes Verständnis sowohl zur Akzeptanz von Risiken aber auch zu Polarisierung und starker Ablehnung führen; hingegen ist Unverständnis oftmals mit kritikloser Akzeptanz verbunden, ein Phänomen, das wir als Magie des Unverständlichen bezeichnen. Wir schlagen eine Taxonomie verschiedener Modi und Entwicklungspfade von wissenschaftlichem (Un–)Verständnis vor: Aus einer Zone der (a) Ignoranz und Indifferenz führt ein Pfad zu (b) Vertrautheit und Akzeptanz, ein zweiter zu (c) Fragilität und Polarisierung, und ein dritter zur (d) Magie der Unverständlichkeit. Wir beschreiben Charakteristika von Risikobereichen, die beeinflussen, in welche Richtung sich der öffentliche Diskurs entwickelt und diskutieren Implikationen für die Wissenschaftskommunikation.


Modes of Understanding and the Magic of the Incomprehensible

Abstract. We propose a hypothetical classification of different types of public understanding of science and discuss how these types relate to risk perception. Empirically, an increasing understanding of science may lead to acceptance of risks as well as to polarization and strong rejection; on the other hand, a lack of understanding is often associated with uncritical acceptance, a phenomenon that we call the magic of incomprehensibility. We propose a taxonomy of different modes and paths of scientific (in–)comprehension: From a zone of (a) ignorance and indifference, one path leads to (b) familiarity and acceptance, a second path to (c) fragility and polarization, and a third path to (d) the magic of incomprehensibility. We describe the characteristics of risk domains that affect which path is taken in public discourse, and we discuss implications for science communication.

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