Abstract
Pay for performance can have a positive or a negative influence on actual performance. The aim of this study was to give an explanation for this contradiction. We demonstrated that the variability of the payment can act as a stressor. According to the transactional model of stress, the influence on performance depends on the subjective interpretation of the variability as challenge or threat. Therefore we manipulated the degree of variability. The data showed decreasing performance for participants who preferred less-variable payments. They performed better under a less-variable rather than more-variable payment. The participants who preferred more-variable payment schemes showed the opposite pattern. These participants showed a higher performance under a more-variable rather than less-variable payment scheme.
Motiviert leistungsabhängiger Lohn die Angestellten zu höherer Leistung? Die Forschungsergebnisse zum Effekt von leistungsabhängigem Lohn auf die Arbeitsleistung sind widersprüchlich: Leistungsabhängiger Lohn kann zu einer Steigerung der Leistung führen, da der höhere Anreiz motiviert. Leistungsabhängiger Lohn kann die Leistung jedoch auch mindern, denn er birgt das Risiko weniger zu verdienen und erhöht den Druck. Wird dieser Druck als zu stressend erlebt, blockieren sie die Leistung. Angesichts des häufigen Einsatzes von individualisierten, leistungsabhängigen Löhnen in der Praxis, setzt sich dieser Artikel das Ziel zu klären, unter welchen Umständen leistungsabhängiger Lohn die Arbeitsleistung steigert oder mindert. Gemäss dem Transaktionalen Stressmodell und dem daraus entstandenen Challenge-Hindrance-Stressmodell sind subjektive Wahrnehmung und individuelles Coping ausschlaggebend. Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitnehmerinnen können die Variabilität des Lohns als herausfordernd oder bedrohlich empfinden, je nachdem, wie sie dessen Passung zu den eigenen Fähigkeiten bewerten. Entsprechend werden sie zu erhöhter Leistung motiviert oder demotiviert. In der hier berichteten Studie hatten Teilnehmer die Aufgabe, 24 arithmetische Probleme zu lösen. Für jede richtig gelöste Aufgabe bekamen sie entweder einen stark variablen oder einen schwach variablen Lohn. Im Vorfeld wurde gemessen, welchen Grad der Variabilität des Lohnes sie bevorzugen. Die Daten belegen, dass die Personen dann verminderte Leistung zeigen, wenn die Variabilität des Lohns nicht mit ihrer Präferenz übereinstimmt. Bevorzugt eine Person einen schwach variablen Lohn, ist ihre Leistung bei einem schwach variablen Lohn höher als bei einem stark variablen Lohn. Bevorzugt eine Person einen stark variablen Lohn, ist ihre Leistung bei einem stark variablen Lohn höher als bei einem schwach variablen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die individuelle Bewertung von variablen Löhnen und die darin enthaltene wahrgenommene Passung zwischen der Leistungsfähigkeit des Arbeitnehmers und dessen Lohn darüber entscheiden, ob leistungsabhängiger Lohn anspornt oder hemmt.
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