Good Things Don’t Come Easy (to Mind)
Explaining Framing Effects in Judgments of Truth
Abstract
Recently, the general phenomenon of a positive-negative-asymmetry was extended to judgments of truth. That is, negatively framed statements were shown to receive substantially higher truth ratings than formally equivalent statements framed positively. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect are unknown, so far. In the current work, two potential accounts are introduced and tested against each other in three experiments: On the one hand, negative framing may induce increased elaboration and thereby persuasion. Alternatively, negative framing could yield faster retrieval or generation of evidence and thus influence subjective veracity via experiential fluency. Two experiments drawing on response latencies and one manipulating the delay between information acquisition and judgment provide support for the fluency-based account. Overall, results replicate and extend the negatively-biased framing effect in truth judgments and show that processing fluency may account for it.
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