Introspection in Psychology
Its Contribution to Theory and Method in Memory Research
Abstract
Abstract. Memory is typically conceptualized as a mental space where information is stored until it is retrieved for current processing. This archive account has been undermined by a multitude of findings, however, calling for a theoretical and also a methodological reorientation. In particular, we consider it timely to include an introspective mode of research into the study of memory because such introspective enquiry can provide insights into the recall process that go beyond those of third-person research. The limitations often associated with introspection (e.g., its seemingly subjective quality and its post hoc nature) are well justified – but only as long as the more immature impromptu introspections are concerned. A more systematically developed form of introspection can overcome these limitations. Such a systematic approach is outlined and used here to develop a taxonomy of mental processes involved in recall. Our observations lend support to a reconstruction account and allow for a differentiation of mental activities involved in various types of recall.
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